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ABSTRACT

IDENTITY AND POLITICAL REALIGNMENT
AMONG HISPANIC VOTERS

Tyler Durfee
Political Science Department
Bachelor of Arts

Hispanics are a rising demographic and political force in the United States and
their influence is projected to grow in the coming years. Because of this, an
understanding of what influences Hispanic political attitudes and voting behavior is
critical in developing election strategies. The Democratic Party has historically had the
most success at forming a Hispanic coalition. However, party coalitions are not always
fixed and have shifted as cross-cutting issues divide the public. Although existing
literature has developed several party-oriented explanations for why realignment occurs,
there has not been an in-depth study focusing on how demographic changes within a
particular population can influence party realignment. I examine how Hispanic identity,
cultural assimilation, religious affiliation, religiosity, and immigration policy affect
Hispanic alignment with the Democratic party. Hispanic identity and liberal immigration
policy preferences increase Democratic alignment, while cultural assimilation decreases
it. Religious affiliation and religiosity have no statistically significant effect on
Democratic alignment. Hispanic voter support for liberal immigration policy suppressed
turnout for Trump, but did not translate to voter mobilization for Clinton.
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I. Introduction
Hispanics are a rising force in the United States and their influence is projected to
grow. There are currently 56.5 million Hispanics living in the United States. In 1960,
Hispanics made up a mere 3.5% of US residents, growing to 17.6% by 2015. Although
historically the majority of this population growth has come from immigration, since
2000 the proportion of foreign-born Hispanics has declined. Presently, 2/3 of Hispanics
are US-born (Flores 2017). This is significant from a political perspective, since
individuals born in the US are automatically US citizens with voting rights. Half of all
US counties have a population of at least 1,000 Hispanics. In particular, Hispanics have
significant political influence in Florida and southwestern states such as California,
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas (Pew Research Center 2016a). As the Hispanic
population continues to grow, their political influence in other states will also increase.
Given this rise in Hispanic prominence, both parties have an incentive to gain
Hispanic support. The Democratic Party has had the most success at establishing a
Hispanic coalition, carefully targeting their campaign messaging and party platform to
attract Hispanic voters (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016). Their current website includes a
page for Latino1 voters which highlights the work of DNC Chair Tom Perez (a secondgeneration immigrant), the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, and their National Hispanic
Leadership agenda. The page also prominently displays their platform to “fix our broken
immigration system” by establishing a “pathway to citizenship” (Democratic National
Committee 2019).

1

Hispanic and Latino are used interchangeably throughout this work, following Pew
convention (Taylor et al. 2012). However, although both terms will be used
interchangeably, they are not technically the same, as will be discussed later in this work.
1

The Republican Party has also made sporadic attempts to reach Hispanic voters.
For example, after Mitt Romney won a historically low percentage of the Hispanic vote
during the 2012 presidential election, Republican officials created an “Autopsy”
emphasizing the need for Hispanic outreach. Highlighting the aforementioned
demographic trends, they outlined a plan to bring Hispanic voters to their “rightful home”
in the Republican Party by calling on leadership to, among other strategies, “embrace and
champion comprehensive immigration reform” and “engage the Hispanic faith-based
communities” (Republican National Committee 2012). Of course, with the rise of Trump,
the party has shifted away from this trajectory in both rhetoric and campaign strategy.
Nonetheless, their current website includes a page specifically for Hispanic voters,
asserting that Republicans are “engaging the [Hispanic] community, hearing their
concerns and sharing our values and ideas” (Republican National Committee 2019).
These examples highlight that, at least on paper, both parties recognize the importance of
Hispanic voters in securing electoral victory.
Regardless of the aforementioned rhetoric, Hispanics currently are substantially
more likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party than the Republican Party, compared to
the general population. As seen in Figure 1, during the last election 47% of registered
Hispanic voters identified themselves as Democrats, 32% as Unaffiliated, and 16% as
Republicans (Pew Research Center 2016b). By way of comparison, the general
population of registered voters is 33% Democratic, 34% Unaffiliated, and 29%
Republican (Pew Research Center 2016c).2 However, party alignment is not static and the
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Note that a portion of Unaffiliated vote with either party and behave as partisans on vote
choice. Further discussion of partisan behavior is included later in this work.
2

current party alignment will not necessarily remain a permanent feature of politics in the
United States.
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Figure 1. Percentage of Registered Voters by Party Alignment
(Pew Research Center 2016c)
Many popular commenters acknowledge the growing influence of Hispanic voters
on US elections; however, they draw vastly different conclusions about what the effect
will be. Some pundits argue that Hispanic population growth will guarantee future
Democratic electoral victories (e.g. Manchester 2018). If this indeed proves true, states
with high concentrations of Hispanics, such as Texas and Florida, may turn blue thus
ruining Republican chances of ever winning the Presidency. However, this claim relies
on the assumption that current rates of Hispanic Democratic alignment will remain steady
in spite of demographic change.
On the other hand, other commentators argue that Hispanics are, as a group, more
socially conservative and issues such as abortion could attract them to the Republican
coalition, bolstering Republican strength in key states (e.g. Menendez 2011). In this
scenario, Republicans would make inroads in Democratic strongholds such as California,
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dashing Democratic dreams of ever obtaining a majority in Congress. However, this
claim assumes that social issues will have the strength to override party allegiance and
that no other policies will reinforce the current party alignment. Both of these
explanations tend to view Hispanics as a static, homogenous group and do not consider
how dynamic processes could affect a party realignment. An in-depth examination of
party realignment and demographic trends within the Hispanic community is needed to
develop accurate predictions of the future political landscape of the United States.
II. Literature Review
Party Realignment
New Party Alignment

Old Party Alignment

Party A
Coalition

Party B
Coalition

Party A
Policy

Party A
Coalition
New Line of
Party Cleavage

Cross-cutting
Issue
Party B
Policy

Party B
Coalition

Old Line of
Party Cleavage

Figure 2. Cross-cutting Issue Party Realignment Model
Party coalitions are divided by a line of party cleavage. New coalitions form around a
new line of party cleavage if a salient cross-cutting issue arises, both parties adopt
polarized policies, and the issue is important enough to motivate voters to change their
party alignment. This model is adapted from Sundquist’s party realignment model
(Sundquist 1983).
Party realignment occurs when a significant portion of voters shift affiliation from
one party to another. This is typically marked by “critical elections” in which one can
measure a substantial change in party alignment (Key 1955). Several realignments have
occurred throughout the history of the United States, although there is some debate
regarding the specifics of when they occurred (J. E. Campbell 2006). Party realignment
4

models generally focus on changes within the parties themselves that result in voters
changing their party identification. In particular, Sundquist’s quintessential party
realignment model maintains that realignments have their origin in the rise of a new
political issue, or several related issues, that cut across the existing line of party cleavage
(Figure 2).
Additional party realignment literature maintains a similar focus on changes within
the party, including how realignment is affected by polarizing reforms in the party
nomination process (Paulson 2009), the political maneuvering of individual candidates
(Cannon and Sousa, 1992), the ability of parties to mobilize voters (Prindle 1979;
Darmofal and Nardulli 2010), and changes in party platforms on issues such as civil
rights or economic policy (Petrocick 1987; Miller 1991; Fleck 1999). However, there has
not been a similar focus on how changes in the demographic makeup of voters
themselves can result in party realignment.
In spite of the over-arching focus on institutional or policy changes within a party,
some literature suggests that demographic changes can also influence party
realignment. Key, who pioneered the concept of critical elections leading to realignment,
argued that long-term demographic change could be part of the groundswell that
contributes to a critical election. Nonetheless, his focus remained on party action to
capitalize on that demographic change (Key 1959). In addition, there has been some
examination of how the arrival of immigrants shifts voting patterns over time (Darmofal
and Nardulli 2010), although there has not been an analysis of how long-term changes
within an immigrant community affect party alignment. Therefore, a more in-depth
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examination of the effect demographic change can have on realignment is necessary,
particularly given the growing importance of Hispanic voters in US politics.
Building off the existing literature, I create a theoretical model of how
demographic change can spark party realignment, independent of institutional or policy
change from each party. This serves as a baseline for future Hispanic alignment in the
United States, assuming that neither party reacts to this demographic trend. I then
examine a scenario in which party action can potentially circumvent demographic-based
party realignment. Finally, I determine whether the parameters of these models apply to
Hispanics and test them using survey data from the 2016 Presidential Election.
Expanding the Party Realignment Model
Old Party Alignment

Party A
Group
Coalition

New Party Alignment

Party B
Group
Coalition

Party A
Group
Coalition

General Population’s
Group Line of
Line of Party Cleavage
Party Cleavage
Demographic
Change

Party B
Group
Coalition

New Line of
Party Cleavage

Figure 3. Demographic Change Party Realignment Model
A group of voters have a unique group identity and concerns, resulting in a different line
of party cleavage compared to the general population. Over time, demographic change
dilutes the distinct group identity. As a result, the group forms new coalitions around a
new line of party cleavage that resembles the general population.
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In order for demographic-based realignment to occur among a distinct group of
voters, they must have a distinct political identity and undergo demographic change that
result in political assimilation. First, the group must have a distinct identity that
differentiates them from the general population. A unique identity will give them a
distinct set of concerns and therefore different political preferences. Thus, the group
identity will manifest itself politically, resulting in a unique political alignment that
differs from the general population. Of course, not every group is homogenous, so a line
of cleavage will still divide the group between both parties; however, that line of
cleavage will be different from the line dividing the general population. Second, over
time the group must assimilate with the general population and, in the process, lose their
political distinctiveness. If the group loses their unique identity, their concerns will
change as well, shifting their political preferences to match the general population. As a
result, a group-specific realignment will occur with a new party cleavage that matches the
general population (Figure 3). Of course, if elements of the group identity remain, the
new line of party cleavage may not perfectly match the general population, but the
general concept will still hold true. This change will occur if the parties do nothing to
maintain the status quo.
To circumvent demographic-based realignment, a group identity-based cleavage
must exist, an issue must arise that is salient to the group and outweighs all other
concerns, and both parties must take polarized stances that reinforce group identity. First,
the group must have a distinct political identity based on their group identity as outlined
in the demographic realignment model. Second, the issue must be salient to that
particular group and transcend other political concerns. If the issue does not specifically
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evoke group identity and override other considerations, it will not have the relevance or
the strength needed to cement group identity as a factor of party alignment.
Consequently, demographic trends will obscure that group identity over time and prompt
realignment.
Old Party Alignment

New Party Alignment

Party A
Group
Coalition

Party B
Group
Coalition

Party A
Policy

Party B
Policy

Reinforcing
Issue

Party A
Group
Coalition

Party B
Group
Coalition

Line of Party
Cleavage

Line of Party
Cleavage

Figure 4. Reinforcing Issue Party Realignment Model
A group of voters with are aligned along a line of party cleavage based on their group
identity. Both parties polarize around an issue that reinforces the existing coalitions by
cementing the group identity. In spite of demographic change, the group does not
undergo a realignment.
Finally, both parties must take a polarized stance in a way that reinforces the group
identity. As in Sundquist’s model, if neither party takes a distinct stance then the status
quo will remain the same. However, this policy polarization is different from the crosscutting issue in Sundquist’s model. which divided existing coalitions. Rather, this
alignment of policies must serve to reinforce existing coalitions. As a result of these
factors, group identity will be strengthened and strongly associated with party identify.
This strengthened identity will override demographic changes, preventing a realignment
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(Figure 4). Of course, demographic trends still may have some small effect and
polarization within the group over the issue may shift the line of cleavage slightly, but the
general concept is what matters.
If these models hold true, Hispanics will have a distinct group identity and that
group identity will influence their unique party alignment. Over time, Hispanics will
gradually lose their unique group identity and political distinctiveness. As a result,
Hispanic party alignment will come to resemble that of the general population. However,
if the Democratic and Republican parties polarize around an issue that reinforces
Hispanic identity, then party identity will override demographic change.
Hispanic Group Identity
In general, group identity is cemented as individuals connect their personal
identity to a larger group identity. Social groups based on common identifiers such race
or class may not have an inherently political basis; however, group influence can lead
members of the group to behave in politically distinct ways (Campbell et al. 1960).
Common political attitudes within a group form during interactions with parents, friends,
and co-workers which disseminate social and political cues (either explicit or hidden).
These cues shape the political perspective of an individual (Cundy 1979). Group
identities also form as individuals come to view their own welfare is “inseparable from
that of the group.” Identity become politicized as groups feel that inequalities exist not
because of individual choices but systemic processes (Miller et al. 1981). Finally, group
identities can affect partisanship and political activities such as voting (Greene 1999). In
recent years, “social sorting” in which groups more frequently tend to associate with one
party or the other has occurred, contributing to an increase in party polarization (Mason
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and Wronski 2018). These factors explain why political scientists can measure distinct
differences in political perspective across racial and socioeconomic divisions: the
socialization effect within each of these groups creates vibrant and distinct political subcultures.
In order for Hispanics as a group to form a distinct voting bloc under the
demographic change and reinforcing issue party realignment models, there must be a
shared group identity; however, within the United States, the use of “Hispanic” as a panethnic identifier may not reflect actual group cohesion. “Hispanic” refers to a linguistic
categorization of individuals who originate from predominately-Spanish speaking
countries including Spain, 18 countries in North and South America, and the US territory
of Puerto Rico. “Latino” is a broader categorization that can also include Portuguesespeaking Brazilians, French-speaking Haitians, and English-speaking Belizeans (Fox
2011). With such a variety of linguistic, geographical, and national backgrounds, the use
of “Hispanic” as a pan-ethnic identifier may not reflect actual group cohesion,
particularly given that different nationalities have faced distinct challenges while
immigrating to the US (DiPietro 2012). Indeed, one study found that the majority of
Hispanics living in the United States (51%) prefer to be identified by their country of
origin, rather than a pan-ethnic identifier such as “Hispanic” or “Latino” because they
don’t see a shared common culture among US Hispanics, although only 21% prefer the
term “American” to describe their identity (Taylor et al. 2012). Therefore, a shared
Hispanic identity is not a given.
Nonetheless, in spite of these limitations, a pan-ethnic Hispanic identity may be
adopted in certain contexts, particularly in response to political challenges. For example,
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shared language and common perceived needs led Mexican-Americans3 and Puerto
Ricans to form a political coalition in Chicago (Padilla 1985). In addition, among US
Hispanics a sense of exclusion from the broader society because of their national origin
and experiences of racial discrimination both contribute to higher levels of pan-ethnic
identity as well as increased political participation (Stokes 2003; Masuoka 2006). Higher
levels of Hispanic identity are also associated with greater support for progressive
political policies compared to the general population (Segura 2012). Therefore,
involvement in US politics can aid in creating a distinct Hispanic identity with a distinct
policy alignment.
Two factors in particular influence Hispanic group identity: perceived
discrimination and linked fate. Perceived discrimination on basis of race or ethnicity
increases the likelihood that an individual will identify with the larger racial/ethnic group
(Stokes 2003; Masuoka 2006; DiPietro 2012). Linked fate is the extent to which an
individual believes that what happens to the group will also happen to them: a stronger
sense of linked fate increases the likelihood that an individual will identify with the
group. This measure has most commonly been used to study African American group
identity (Simien 2005). Both of these measures are also relevant for Hispanics. Sanchez
and Vargas demonstrated this by creating biplots of group identity factors across race and
ethnicity. They found that, while African Americans do have the highest levels of group
consciousness overall, especially linked fate, these factors are still relevant to and have a

3

Because this study examines politics in a US context, the term “American” will refer to
a citizen of the United States. It should be noted that in throughout Latin America the
term “American” is broadly used to describe any inhabitant of North or South America
(Fox 2011).
11

distinct effect on Hispanics. In particular, “[perceived] discrimination is the foundation
for group identity” among Hispanics. Finally, they found that linked fate and group
consciousness are distinct factors in determining Hispanic identity. (Sanchez and Vargas
2016). Therefore, a distinct Hispanic group identity can be measured by considering panethnic identification, perceived discrimination, and linked fate.

H1: Hispanic identity (measured by pan-ethnic identification, perceived discrimination,
and linked fate) will be positively associated with Democratic alignment compared to
voters with low Hispanic identity.

Generational and Linguistic Demographic Change
Given that a distinct Hispanic identity exists, demographic change, particularly
generational change, can diminish it over time. Structural Integration Theory indicates
that over time different groups will begin to integrate due to cultural assimilation,
changes in economic incentives, and shifts in political motivations (Gatlung 1968). In
particular, descendants of first generation immigrants will gradually integrate with the
general population. As a result, US-born Hispanics adopt the socioeconomic
characteristics of their neighbors, with each successive generation becoming less distinct
as a political group (Abrajano 2011).
One key facilitator of this demographic change is English proficiency. As an
illustration, 89.7% of US-born Hispanics speak fluent English, while only 34.6% of
foreign-born Hispanics speak fluent English (Flores 2017). In particular, English
proficiency increases over time among second generation Hispanics (Tran 2010). This
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linguistic shift allows subsequent generations to establish a stronger cultural connection
to the United States. For example, they are more likely to watch or read news in English
and thus view current events through the same perspective of the general population (Pew
Research Center 2013). One study found that an inability to speak English was the
leading cause of perceived discrimination (46%), more than immigration status (22%),
income (16%), or skin color (11%) (Hakimzadeh and Cohn 2007). This is relevant, given
that discrimination reinforces group identity. Therefore, generation and linguistic
changes are measures of demographic change that can dilute Hispanic identity. However,
it should be noted that immigrant generation and English proficiency may not translate to
political assimilation, but instead give rise to unique minority cultures in the American
social landscape. In particular, minority middle classes may share a minority culture of
mobility that links them together in the face of racial discrimination (Neckerman et al.
1999). If this is the case, demographic change could increase Hispanic identity.

H2: Hispanic measures of demographic change (measured by generation and English
proficiency) will have some effect on Democratic alignment.

Religious Demographic Change
Changes in religious alignment among Hispanics may also translate to a change in
party alignment. Religious institutions, while not inherently political, can create group
identities that translate into distinct political identity and behavior (Wald et al. 2005).
Religion plays a relevant role in shaping party alignment, as the unique teachings of each
religion can result in unique political views. In addition, socialization within a religious
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congregation can create a distinct culture, with political views disseminated via social
ques, fostering a unique political community (McKenzie 2013). Within religions, ethnic
subgroups can develop their own distinct religious culture. In particular, Hispanics at
times have unique ways of understanding religious teachings and practices compared to
other groups in the same religion. For example, Catholicism in Mexico often
incorporates “symbols, rituals, and other elements of Mexican culture” (McDaniel
2008). In general, Hispanics are more likely to attend religious meetings with other
Hispanics, thus reinforcing a unique political identity through their religious identity
(McKenzie 2013). Therefore, Hispanic religious group identity can foster distinct
political alignments.
However, the different religious teachings of various sects can cause divisions
within the larger Hispanic community, diluting the strength of group identity. In
particular, policy preferences on same-sex marriage and abortion differ by religious
affiliation. In 2013, for example, a higher percentage of unaffiliated Hispanics supported
legalizing same-sex marriage (67%) and legalizing abortion in all or most cases (58%)
compared to Evangelical Hispanics, who supported same-sex marriage (19%) and
abortion (24%) at substantially lower rates. Catholic support for same-sex marriage
(49%) and abortion (38%) fell in between these two groups (Figure 5). This is politically
relevant since both Democrats and Republicans are polarized around these issues. If
course, the extent to which these divisions within the Hispanic community will affect the
larger group identity depend on the proportion of Hispanics in each sect and long-term
changes in religious alignment.
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Figure 5. Hispanic Policy Preferences by Religious Affiliation
(Pew Research Center 2014a)
Dynamic trends in Hispanic affiliation between Evangelicals, Catholics, and the
religiously unaffiliated can dilute a unified Hispanic political identity. In 2013, 55% of
Hispanics were Catholic, 18% were unaffiliated, and 16% were Evangelical, with the
remaining 11% associating with other religious groups (Pew Research Center
2014b). However, this distribution is not static: from 2010 to 2013, the number of
Hispanics who identified as Catholic declined 12 percentage points from 67% to
55%. At the same time, the number of unaffiliated Hispanics has grown 8% and the
number of Hispanic Evangelicals has grown 4% (Pew Research Center 2014b). Because
unaffiliated Hispanics are more likely to support same-sex marriage and legal abortion
than Catholics and Evangelical Hispanics are more likely to oppose the same issues, if
these demographic trends continue the Hispanic population will become polarized
between secular and moral cultural worldviews. This division, in addition to generational
and linguistic change, could override Hispanic identity, prompting Hispanics to re-sort
into a new party alignment. Note that this would not be a party-driven realignment, but a
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demographics-driven realignment. Political parties would have to reposition themselves
due to changes among voters, rather than voters repositioning themselves due to changes
within the parties.
In addition to religious affiliation, another key factor in establishing religious
group identity is “religiosity” or the level of religious commitment. The common factors
used to measure religiosity are how important an individual views their religious identity,
how frequently they attend religious services (other than weddings and funerals, since
these events can draw individuals from diverse religious backgrounds), and how
frequently they pray. These identifiers hold true across religious traditions and are
distinct measures of religious commitment (Mockabee, Monson and Grant 2001).
Religiosity also has an effect on Hispanic views of abortion and same sex marriage as
well as party alignment (Pew Research Center 2014a). Therefore, religiosity is a key
control of religious group identity.

H3: Evangelical Hispanics will be negatively associated Democratic alignment.
H4: Unaffiliated Hispanics will be positively associated with Democratic alignment.

Immigration as a Reinforcing Issue
Having established the basis of Hispanic identity and demographic change, I now
consider whether immigration is a salient issue that could reinforce existing Hispanic
group identity. In the past, when both parties have taken a polarized stance on
immigration, it served to mobilize Hispanic voters and increase their political
involvement. For example, Proposition 187 in California which would have denied
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public services to undocumented immigrants and enacted a policy requiring state
employees to automatically report undocumented immigrants to federal authorities.
Republican leaders endorsed this platform, while Democratic leaders opposed it. Before
this critical election, both parties competed for the Hispanic vote; however, after Hispanic
voters turned decidedly towards the Democratic party, turning California solidly blue in
the process (Nowraseth 2016). Across the nation, when immigration policies are
racialized or tied explicitly to Hispanic identity, mobilization rates increase among
Hispanics (Zepeda-Millán 2017).
A significant portion of immigrants are Hispanic: 27% of immigrants come from
Mexico, 10% from the Caribbean, and 7% from South America. Although in recent
years the number of new immigrants from Latin America have declined (since 2009 the
majority of new immigrants were from Asia), immigration is still a fresh and relevant
experience form many Hispanics in the United States (Lopez and Bialik 2017).4 All other
things remaining equal, structural integration theory suggests that importance of
immigration policy among Hispanics will decline over time to the level of the general
population (Abrajano 2011). This will especially be true once Hispanics are no longer
among the latest immigrant arrivals and immigration policy no longer affects close
friends and family.
However, the current political climate around immigration could bring that policy
issue to the forefront, overriding other concerns. Hispanics overwhelmingly support

4

In 2015, there were 44.7 million immigrants living in the United States. 19.8 million
were naturalized citizens, 11.9 were lawful permanent residents, 11.0 million were
undocumented, and 2.1 million had temporary visas (Cohn 2017). Nearly half of all
immigrants have voting rights.
17

(87%) granting legal status to “Dreamers” who entered the US illegally as children
(Lopez et al. 2018). Hispanics also support other liberal immigration policies such as
guest worker programs and a pathway to citizenship. Although support for liberal
immigration policies is lower among second and third generation Hispanics, it still
significantly higher than the general population (Abrajano 2011). In the current political
climate, Hispanics are experiencing discrimination on basis of their background (38%),
view the situation for Hispanics in the country as worsening (47%), and have concerns
about their place in America (49%), and worry that they, a family member, or a close
friend could be deported (55%). These concerns were lower under previous
administrations (Lopez et al. 2018). As discussed above, perceived discrimination can
serve as a catalyst for forming or strengthening group identity.
Furthermore, both parties are taking a polarized stance on immigration in a way
that reinforces the existing line of cleavage. The Republican Party opposes granting legal
status to undocumented immigrants, while the Democratic Party supports it.5 Since a
majority of Hispanics are currently Democrats and a majority of Hispanics support the
types of policies endorsed by the Democratic Party, the current partisan policy alignment
serves to reinforce the existing party line of cleavage among Hispanics.
Finally, partisan rhetoric around immigration policy serves to link this policy with
group identity. Immigration policy was a central topic of debate during the 2016

5

The Republican platform states that “illegal immigration endangers everyone” and they
“oppose any form of amnesty” for illegal immigrants (Republican National Committee
2016). The Democratic platform calls for a distinction to be made between illegal
immigrants “who pose a threat” and “hardworking families” while calling for
“comprehensive immigration reform” and a “pathway to citizenship” (Democratic
National Committee 2016).
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Presidential Election (Winders 2016). Furthermore, the rhetoric used by President Trump
specifically ties this issue to group identity. Using just one example, during his
presidential bid speech, he stated that Mexican immigrants “have lots of problems, and
they’re bringing those problems with [sic] us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing
crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.” He then broadened his
claim, stating “It’s coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over South and
Latin America” (Washington Post 2015). Although a comprehensive scholarly study of
Trump’s rhetoric does not yet exist, this quote is representative of the general content and
tone of Trump’s public statements regarding Hispanics. He explicitly links group
identities to immigration policies. Therefore, immigration is a reinforcing issue that is
salient, polarized, and intrinsically tied to group identity. This fulfills the necessary
parameters required to test the reinforcing issue model.

H5: Hispanic support of liberal immigration policy will be positively associated with
Democratic alignment.
H6: Support for liberal immigration policy will maintain a statistically significant
impact on Democratic alignment even across generations.
H7: Support for liberal immigration policy will suppress Hispanic turnout for Trump.

III. Data and Methodology
I used data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). The
CCES conducts 20-minute pre-election interviews on variety of relevant subjects and a
10-minute post-election interview with the same participants to determine their voting
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habits. CCES data is voter validated, meaning that the survey participants are matched to
public voting records, focusing the study on politically active participants, a relevant
group in measuring party realignment (CCES 2019). Parallel to this study, the CCES
conducted a Latino-Hispanic Survey, which was conducted with an additional battery of
questions specific to Hispanics. Participants in the survey had an option to take it in
English or Spanish, ensuring that the sample can include Hispanics for whom English is
not their primary language (Resource Center for Minority Data 2019). The 2016 study
included an oversample of 2,023 Hispanic voters. Such a large sample size makes it
possible to accurately represent Hispanic voting patterns on a detailed level. The CCES
also utilizes RELTRAD, a survey method in which the religious affiliation of a
participant can be narrowed down to a specific sect, usually within 2-3 questions
(Steensland et al. 2000). This provides a fine-tuned understanding of religious affiliation.
Wording for each relevant survey question can be found in Appendix 3. In each
question, if the participant did not answer the question or put “Don’t know” as their
answer, the response was coded as missing and not included in creating the variables.
Dependent Variable
Although an increasing number of Americans call themselves Independent, true
Independents without a clear party preference are rare. Rather, most Independents can be
divided as leaning towards the Republican or Democratic party. In other words, as far as
voting behavior is concerned, many are Independents in name only and act as de facto
Republicans and Democrats (Smidt 1982; Petrocik 2009). For this reason, I utilized a 7point spread of party identity, ranging from Strong Republican to Strong Democrat with
Independents in the middle. This 7-point variable ensures my analysis includes the full
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range of party identification. 308 (17%) respondents align with the Republican Party,
236 (13%) are pure Independents, and 1,300 (71%) align with the Democratic Party
(Appendix 2). For the multinomial analysis, I created a categorical variable with a
baseline of those who did not vote and separate categories for individuals who voted for
Clinton, Trump, and Other (a catch-all category of the remaining candidates). This
analysis only includes registered voters. 325 (37%) respondents did not vote, 365 (42%)
voted for Clinton, and 143 (16%) voted for Trump (Appendix 2).
Control Variables
Gender, education, race, age, and ideology are all predictors of partisan identity
(Pew Research Center 2018). I therefore use gender, education, age, and ideology as
controls to isolate my independent variables as unique predictors of party identity;
however, I did not include race as a control variable. I also created an age squared
variable since the effect of age on voting is quadratic (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).
Finally, because national origin has a significant effect on Hispanic identity and political
experience in the United States, I created a region control variable (Pew Research Center
2006). Frequency tables for each control variable can be found in Appendix 2.
Common racial categories used in the United States are problematic when
considering Hispanic group identity: in many US-based studies on race, including the
CCES, individuals are asked to identify their race based on US Census racial categories,
with a separate question asking about their ethnic identity.6 This practice tends to

6

Throughout history, various categorization systems have been used by different
societies to arbitrarily classify humans into racial categories (Smedley and Smedley
2005). Historically, colonial racial categories in Latin America divided people as
Europeans, Africans, and Native Americans, with various subcategories for the
individuals who, on basis of their ancestry, belonged to multiple groups (Fox
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confuse, rather than clarify, Hispanic racial identities. For example, one study determined
that most Hispanics don’t see themselves fitting into the US Census categories, with over
51% identifying as “some other race” or volunteering “Hispanic/Latino” as their race
(Taylor et al. 2012). Therefore, I did not use race as a control variable since the current
classification system is inadequate at distinguishing between unique Hispanic racial
identities. I have included a break-down of the data by racial category (Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Racial Distribution (n = 2023)
Independent Variables
For the purposes of this study, Hispanics are individuals self-identify as Hispanic
and have immigrated or descended from immigrants from one of 22 countries in Central
America, South America, and the Caribbean, as well as Spain (Appendix 2). To measure
Hispanic identity, I created three variables: Hispanic identity, perceived discrimination,

2011). Today, the US Census Bureau uses self-identification and the racial categories of
White, Black/African American, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian, and Native
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander to categorize people (US Census Bureau 2017). For the
majority of US history, the US Census classified Hispanics as “White,” although some
were considered “Black” or “Indian.” The notable exception is the 1930 Census, where
“Mexican” was included as a racial category. Since the 1970s, the census has included a
separate ethnic identity question establishing the category of “Hispanic/Latino”
(Rodríquez 2000).
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and linked fate. The CCES includes a series of questions to determine whether
participants principally identity as American, with their country of origin, or as
Latino/Hispanic. 342 (17%) respondents identify as American, 840 (42%) identify with
their national origin, and 837 (42%) identify as Latino/Hispanic (Appendix 2). I coded
these responses into a categorical variable with “Americans” serving as the baseline, a
country-specific identifier as the first category, and a pan-ethnic identity of Hispanic or
Latino as the final category. I then coded a second variable based on the extent to which
a participant perceived discrimination against themselves. 702 (35%) respondents
reported no discrimination, 900 (45%) reported a little to a moderate amount of
discrimination, and 391 (20%) reported a lot to a great deal of discrimination (Appendix
2). Finally, the CCES asks a “linked fate” question, which I coded as a final variable for
Hispanic identity. 503 (25%) respondents expressed no or not much linked fate, 737
(37%) reported some linked fate, and 759 (38%) reported a lot of linked fate (Appendix
2). Although these different variables are to some extent similar, they do not have high
correlations and therefore measure distinct aspects of Hispanic identity (Appendix 1).
To measure cultural assimilation, I created two variables: generations since
immigration and English proficiency. The CCES asks whether the participant, at least
one of their parents, or at least one of their grandparents immigrated to the United States.
From this I created a categorical variable with foreign-born Hispanics as the baseline.
Following the US Census Bureau convention, first generation refers to individuals who
are foreign born, second generation refers to individuals with at least one foreign-born
parent, third generation refers to individuals with at least one foreign-born grandparent,
and fourth generation refers to individuals whose grandparents are US-born (US Census
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Bureau 2016). 1,100 (54.4%) respondents are first generation, 468 (23%) are second
generation, 177 (9%) are third generation and 278 (14%) are fourth generation or later.
In addition, I used an English proficiency question as a second measure for
cultural assimilation. 63 (3%) respondents reported no English speaking ability, 339
(17%) spoke English a little, 382 (19%) spoke English pretty well, and 1,237 (61%)
spoke English very well (Appendix 2). It should be noted that this is a self-reported
assessment and therefore may be an imperfect measure of actual linguistic ability.
However, there is reason to believe that, at least to some extent, the reporting is accurate,
given that 76% of respondents who reported a high level of English proficiency took the
survey in English, thus demonstrating a degree of confidence in the language.
Furthermore, 96% of respondents who expressed little to no English speaking ability
chose to take it in Spanish. Interestingly, 77% of respondents who reported an ability to
speak English “pretty well” chose to take it in Spanish (Table 1). Of course, even this
comparison is imperfect, given that those who chose to take it in Spanish could be
bilingual, thus obscuring actual English ability, and that typical conversational language
skills do not necessarily translate to an ability to take a survey on detailed political topics.
Nonetheless, this still demonstrates that a significant proportion of respondents who
reported high levels of proficiency also felt confident taking a survey in English.
Therefore, although we do not have a perfect measure of English proficiency, there is still
reason to believe that the self-assessment question does measure actual proficiency.
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How well the participant speaks English
Not at all Just a little Pretty well
Very well
Total
English 3 4.8% 12 3.5% 87 22.8% 942 76.2% 1044
Survey
Language Spanish 60 95.2% 327 96.5% 295 77.2% 295 23.8% 980
Total 63
339
382
1237
2024
Table 1. Cross-Tabulation of Survey Language and English Proficiency
To code the religious variables, I utilized the aforementioned RELTRAD data.
Adapting a coding method developed by Burge for R, I used STATA to combine
individual American sects into broader religious groups (Burge 2018). I then created a
categorical variable with a baseline of Unaffiliated7 and the categories of Catholics,
Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants and Other.8 408 (21%) respondents are Unaffiliated,
822 (42%) are Catholic, 372 (19%) are Evangelical, 183 (9%) are Mainline Protestant,
and 168 (7%) belong to some other religion (Appendix 2).
The CCES data also includes measures of religiosity including how important an
individual’s religious identity is to them, religious service attendance, and frequency of
prayer. I scaled each of these variables from 0 to 1 so each variable was weighted on the
same scale. When scaling church attendance, I included the “More than once a week” and
“Once a week” responses in the same category because some religions only hold regular
services once a week. I then combined the weighted variables to form the religiosity
variable. 125 (7%) respondents have 0.0 religiosity, 206 (12%) have 0.1 – 1.0 religiosity,
431 (24%) have 1.1 – 2.0 religiosity, and 1,023 (57 %) have 2.1 – 3.0 religiosity. This

7

“Unaffiliated” includes those who are Atheist, Agnostic, or “Nothing in particular.”
“Other” includes individuals who are Mormon, Eastern Orthodox, Jewish, Buddhist,
Hindu, Black Protestant, or “Something else.” Note that this variable has no substantive
meaning, it is merely a catch-all variable for the remaining religious categories.
8
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measures the gap between Hispanics who are non-religious and Hispanics who are highly
religious (Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Religiosity Distribution (n = 1,785)
I then created an interaction variable with religious affiliation and religiosity, in
order to measure the effect religiosity has on religious affiliation. As outlined in the
literature review, group identity formation depends on interaction with other members of
the group. Higher rates of religiosity increase the likelihood of an individual interacting
with a religious group and assimilating with their unique political culture. I also created
an interaction variable with religious affiliation and English proficiency. As outlined in
the literature review, a unique Hispanic religious identity may form if an individual
attends church with other Hispanics, typically in a Spanish-speaking congregation.
Unfortunately, the CCES data does not include a question asking whether or not the
respondent is associated with a Spanish-speaking congregation. I therefore utilize the
English proficiency variable as a substitute for this measure, operating under the
assumption that an individual with low English proficiency will be more likely to seek
out a Spanish-speaking congregation compared to an individual with a high level of
26

English proficiency. Unfortunately, given the aforementioned limitations of the English
proficiency variable, this measure is imperfect. Subsequent research is therefore needed
to more accurately examine the interaction between religious affiliation and language
proficiency.
To test the reinforcing issue model, I created two more variables. The CCES survey
includes a variety of questions on immigration policy. I created a Grant Citizenship
dummy variable from a question that asked whether the US government should “grant
legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3
years, and hot been convicted of any felony crimes” since this resembled the “pathway to
citizenship” aspect of the DNC platform. 1,522 (75%) respondents supported this policy
(Appendix 2). I then created an Identify and Deport variable from a question that asked
if the US government should “identify and deport illegal immigrants” since this reflected
Trump’s rhetoric on the campaign trail. 383 (19%) respondents supported this policy
(Appendix 2). There is a minimal amount of overlap, with 176 (9%) respondents
supporting both policy and 294 (15%) supporting neither policy. However, the vast
majority of Hispanics (77%) are divided between the two policy options (Table 2). I am
therefore confident in using both of these measures as my immigration policy variables.

Grant
Citizenship

No
Yes
Total

Identify and Deport
No
Yes
294
17.9%
207
54.0%
1,346
82.1%
176
46.0%
1,640
383

Table 2. Cross-Tabulation of Immigration Policies
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Total
501
1,522
2,023

Methodology
I first conducted multicollinearity tests on the dependent, independent, and control
variables to ensure they are not correlated with each other. In STATA, I ran a regression
and determined the Variance Inflating Factor (VIF). A high VIF approaching 5 indicates
multicollinearity, while a low VIF closer to 1 indicates that there is no multicollinearity.
There were no high levels of multicollinearity (Appendix 1).
I used OLS models9 to test the effect Hispanic identity, demographic change, and
immigration policy had on Democratic alignment. Because ideology is a strong measure
of partisan identity, I left it out of the first model and only looked at the effects of
Hispanic identity and cultural assimilation on Democratic alignment. I then added
ideology back into the model (Table 3). I also utilized OLS models to test the effects of
religious identity interacted with religiosity and religious identity interacted with English
proficiency on Democratic alignment. I then added the ideology control to the religious
models (Table 4).
Subsequently, I created a model of Hispanic identity, cultural assimilation, and
immigration policy preference, separated by immigrant generation. This demonstrates
how these factors uniquely effect each immigrant generation (Table 5).
Fnally, I tested the effect immigration policy had on vote choice. For this model, I
utilized the age squared variable instead of the age variable and included measures of
Hispanic identity and cultural assimilation. I did not include a control for partisan

9

Because the dependent variable, ranging from Strong Republican to Strong Democrat, is
made up of ordered categories and is technically not continuous, I also ran an ordered
probit model and found similar statistically significant results. The cut points were also
evenly distributed.
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identity, since this is strongly correlated with vote choice. Because vote choice is a nonordinal categorical variable, I used a multinomial probit model (Table 6).
Separately, I examined the effects of the religious variables on vote choice;
however, because none of the results were statistically significant, I ultimately did not
include them in the statistical models discussed in the results section.
IV. Results
Voters with high levels of Hispanic identity (measured by pan-ethnic identification,
perceived discrimination, and linked fate) are positively associated with Democratic
alignment (Table 3, Model 1). Furthermore, since 83% of respondents have moderate or
high levels of pan-ethnic identification and 75% have moderate or high levels of linked
fate, this result has an impact on a large percentage of Hispanics. The perceived
discrimination factor impacts a smaller, but not insignificant, proportion of Hispanics,
with 35% of respondents reporting moderate to high levels of discrimination. While
these measures of Hispanic identity increase Democratic alignment, higher levels of
demographic change (measured by generation and English proficiency) are negatively
associated with Democratic alignment. Each of these variables were statistically
significant with at least a 90% confidence interval (Table 3, Model 1).
Because a majority of respondents (54%) are currently first-generation immigrants,
the immigrant generation effect does not manifest itself as strongly in the current political
alignment. However, because Hispanic immigration rates have declined while birth rates
remain steady, over time the number of second and third generation Hispanics will also
grow. Therefore, all other factors held equal, the impact of this measure will grow as
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VARIABLES
1. National Identity
2. Hispanic Identity
Perceived Discrimination
Linked Fate
1. Second Generation
2. Third Generation
3. Fourth+ Generation
English Proficiency
Male
Education Level
Family Income
Age
1. Puerto Rico & Caribbean
2. Cuba & South America
3. Other Region

(1)
Democrat (7)

(2)
Democrat (7)

0.307**
(0.145)
0.296**
(0.137)
0.0967***
(0.0365)
0.211***
(0.0479)
-0.252**
(0.126)
-0.512***
(0.178)
-0.479***
(0.162)
-0.140**
(0.0645)
0.0458
(0.0954)
0.0594*
(0.0318)
-0.00502**
(0.00234)
-0.00958***
(0.00337)
0.156
(0.161)
-0.229**
(0.117)
-0.149
(0.153)

0.284**
(0.142)
0.262*
(0.134)
0.0914**
(0.0357)
0.153***
(0.0473)
-0.203
(0.123)
-0.458***
(0.175)
-0.367**
(0.159)
-0.171***
(0.0632)
0.00896
(0.0934)
0.0453
(0.0311)
-0.00322
(0.00230)
-0.00789**
(0.00330)
0.166
(0.157)
-0.229**
(0.114)
-0.112
(0.150)
0.301***
(0.0332)
4.628***
(0.343)

Liberal Ideology
Constant
Observations
R-squared

5.243***
(0.344)
1,789
0.063
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

1,789
0.105

Table 3. Demographic Change OLS Model
Model 1: Hispanic identity and cultural assimilation. Model 2: Ideology added.
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well. On the other hand, because a majority of Hispanics (61.21) currently speak English
with high proficiency, the impact of English proficiency is present in the current political
climate. All other things equal, this impact will also grow as English proficiency rates
increase. Therefore, measures of demographic change currently decrease Democratic
affiliation and the effects of this measure will likely increase with time.
Furthermore, identity and demographic factors remain statistically significant, even
with the inclusion of ideology (Table 3, Model 2). This is significant because ideology is
a strong predictor of party alignment, demonstrating that Hispanic identity and
demographic change both have an effect on party alignment in addition to typical partisan
ideological divisions. These results lend support to my initial hypothesis: Hispanic group
identity can be measured and is associated with Democratic alignment, but over time
demographic changes weaken the strength of Democratic alignment. However, the
marginal effect is a strengthening or weakening of Democratic affiliation: the results do
not translate to full scale realignment to the Republican Party. (Figure 8).
My second OLS model reveals religious affiliation has no statistically significant
effect on Democratic alignment. This holds true, even when taking into account
religiosity and the interaction between religious affiliation and religiosity (Table 4, Model
1).10 In subsequent tests not included in this paper I included this variable in the full
Hispanic identity and demographic change model and the multinomial vote choice
model; however, none of the results were statistically significant. However, religious
affiliation interacted with English proficiency does have a statistically significant effect

10

The only statistically significant measure was the Other category; however, since this is
a catch-all category, these results have no substantial meaning.
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VARIABLES
1. Catholic
2. Evangelical
3. Mainline Protestant
4. Other Religion
Religiosity
1. Catholic x Religiosity
2. Evangelical x Religiosity
3. Mainline Protestant x Religiosity
4. Other Religion x Religiosity

(1)
Democrat (7)

(2)
Democrat (7)

(3)
Democrat (7)

-0.0435
(0.272)
0.0682
(0.527)
0.319
(0.723)
-1.560***
(0.574)
-0.0417
(0.121)
0.0490
(0.159)
0.0555
(0.230)
0.0328
(0.312)
0.650**
(0.263)

0.585
(0.592)
1.240*
(0.669)
0.213
(0.741)
1.064
(0.841)

0.596
(0.578)
1.190*
(0.653)
0.224
(0.723)
1.008
(0.821)

-0.00848
(0.103)
0.0455
(0.0344)
-0.00718***
(0.00274)
-0.00769**
(0.00352)
0.192
(0.173)
-0.0616
(0.122)
-0.382**
(0.156)

-0.0685
(0.143)
-0.155
(0.162)
-0.333*
(0.186)
0.0471
(0.212)
-0.323
(0.231)
0.0108
(0.0960)
0.0754**
(0.0324)
-0.00585**
(0.00237)
-0.0113***
(0.00340)
0.149
(0.161)
-0.213*
(0.116)
-0.416***
(0.147)

5.583***
(0.228)

5.829***
(0.560)

-0.0975
(0.139)
-0.138
(0.158)
-0.296
(0.182)
0.0518
(0.207)
-0.301
(0.226)
-0.0165
(0.0937)
0.0561*
(0.0316)
-0.00403*
(0.00232)
-0.00955***
(0.00333)
0.171
(0.158)
-0.231**
(0.113)
-0.313**
(0.144)
0.314***
(0.0334)
4.948***
(0.554)

1,776
0.032

1,776
0.079

English Proficiency
1. Catholic x English Proficiency
2. Evangelical x English Proficiency
3. Mainline Protestant x English Proficiency
4. Other Religion x English Proficiency
Male
Education Level
Family Income
Age
1. Puerto Rico & Caribbean
2. Cuba & South America
3. Other Region
Liberal Ideology
Constant
Observations
R-squared

1,572
0.024
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.Religious Affiliation and Religiosity OLS Model
Model 1: Religious affiliation and religiosity interaction. Model 2: Religious affiliation
and English proficiency interaction. Model 3: Ideology added.
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with a 90% confidence interval for Evangelical Hispanics: higher levels of English
proficiency are negatively associated with Democratic affiliation (Table 4, Model 2).
Because Evangelicals make up 19% of respondents and their population is growing, this
could have some substantial effect on Democratic alignment; however, given the
aforementioned imprecision of this interactive variable, it is impossible to reliable
determine the full extent of this effect. Nonetheless, this result suggests that further
research into the effect religion and English proficiency has on partisan alignment is
merited. In any case, this measure loses all significance when political ideology is
included in the model (Table 4, Model 3). This means that partisan identity washes out
the impact of this variable.11 Therefore, on a whole, religion does not have a substantial
impact on Hispanic voter realignment. Therefore, I cannot find support to reject the null
hypothesis that there is no difference between the Democratic affiliation of Evangelical
and Unaffiliated Hispanic voters.
My third OLS model tested the effects of immigration policy on party alignment
across immigrant generations. As predicted, Hispanic support for granting citizenship
was positively associated with Democratic affiliation while Hispanic support for
deportation was negatively associated with Democratic affiliation. Support for
citizenship actually had an increasingly higher effect on Democratic affiliation with each
generation. These results were statistically significant across all generations with a 90%
confidence interval or higher (Table 5).

11

In other models, not included in this paper, I found that the interaction between
religious affiliation and English proficiency remains significant when included with
variables in the full Hispanic identity and demographic change model. It is only when
ideology is included in that model it loses its significance.
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VARIABLES
1. National Identity
2. Hispanic Identity
Perceived Discrimination
Linked Fate
English Proficiency
Male
Education Level
Family Income
Age
1. Puerto Rico & Caribbean
2. Cuba & South America
3. Other Region
Liberal Ideology
Grant Citizenship
Identify and Deport
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
(2)
Democrat (7) Democrat (7)
First
Second
Generation
Generation
-0.0332
(0.278)
-0.00474
(0.277)
0.0602
(0.0493)
0.192***
(0.0648)
-0.123*
(0.0740)
0.189
(0.130)
0.0842**
(0.0416)
-0.00224
(0.00328)
-0.0122***
(0.00454)
0.0869
(0.214)
-0.372***
(0.141)
-0.244
(0.380)
0.192***
(0.0463)
0.318**
(0.157)
-0.321*
(0.172)
4.845***
(0.501)

(3)
Democrat (7)
Third
Generation

(4)
Democrat (7)
Fourth
Generation

0.272
(0.431)
-0.395
(0.362)
0.120
(0.129)
0.238
(0.168)
-0.380
(0.417)
-0.195
(0.328)
-0.0866
(0.119)
-0.0132**
(0.00626)
-0.00416
(0.0107)
-0.0519
(0.592)
0.284
(0.621)
-0.0591
(0.353)
0.323***
(0.119)
0.695**
(0.338)
-1.188***
(0.392)
5.219***
(1.858)

0.200
(0.364)
0.0636
(0.284)
0.196**
(0.0973)
-0.269**
(0.122)
-0.384
(0.288)
0.365
(0.253)
-0.231***
(0.0828)
-0.000548
(0.00527)
0.00978
(0.00826)
0.409
(0.407)
2.326***
(0.745)
0.489*
(0.269)
0.570***
(0.0829)
0.978***
(0.269)
0.0933
(0.278)
4.567***
(1.313)

166
0.282

250
0.270

0.614**
(0.238)
0.502**
(0.214)
0.103
(0.0664)
0.0868
(0.0908)
-0.230
(0.167)
0.0312
(0.174)
0.143**
(0.0597)
-0.00622
(0.00494)
0.0113
(0.00688)
0.560
(0.361)
0.109
(0.225)
-0.270
(0.253)
0.309***
(0.0612)
0.451**
(0.211)
-1.207***
(0.237)
3.479***
(0.791)

943
430
0.075
0.245
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5. Immigration Policy Across Immigrant Generations OLS Model Tests 1-4:
Hispanic identity, cultural assimilation, and policy preference. Each test involves a
subsequent immigrant generation.
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These results are particularly interesting given that national and Hispanic identity
are only significant during the second generation, perceived discrimination has no effect
until the fourth generation, linked fate only has a positive statistically significant effect on
Democratic affiliation during the first generation and by the fourth generation has a
negative statistically significant effect on Democratic affiliation, and English proficiency
loses its significance after the first generation. Thus, while measures of Hispanic identity
are inconsistent at predicting Democratic affiliation, immigration policies have a
consistent effect across all generations. Furthermore, this remains true even with the
inclusion of ideology, a strong predictor of party affiliation (Table 5).12 Because 75% of
Hispanics support granting citizenship, this measure has a large substantial effect on
Hispanic party alignment. Therefore, given that immigration policy remains a positive
factor in Democratic alignment across generations, even as other identity-specific factors
disappear, there is support for demographic change realignment model.
My final model measured the relationship between Hispanic identity, demographic
change, and immigration policy. Because 75% of respondents support granting
citizenship, this measure is particularly important. English proficiency and education
level were positive for both Clinton and Trump, meaning that these factors increased
turnout but did not favor one candidate over the other. However, measures of national
and Hispanic identity, linked fate, and support for granting citizenship were all negative,
meaning that they suppressed turnout for Trump. However, none of these factors were
statistically significant for Clinton. This means that a hypothetical voter who identified

12

Another interesting effect is Cuban party alignment: first generation Cubans are
negatively associated with Democratic alignment, while by the fourth generation they are
positively associated with Democratic alignment.
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VARIABLES
1. National Identity
2. Hispanic Identity
Perceived Discrimination
Linked Fate
English Proficiency
1. Second Generation
2. Third Generation
3. Fourth+ Generation
Male
Education Level
Family Income
Age
Age Squared
1. Puerto Rico & Caribbean
2. Cuba & South America
3. Other Region
Grant Citizenship
Identify and Deport

Constant
Observations

(1)
No vote

(2)
Clinton

(3)
Trump

(4)
Other

-0.321
(0.233)
-0.250
(0.224)
-0.0179
(0.0572)
0.0815
(0.0722)
0.511***
(0.0938)
0.542***
(0.200)
0.589*
(0.316)
0.0245
(0.247)
0.197
(0.147)
0.142***
(0.0483)
-0.0111***
(0.00427)
-0.0430
(0.0297)
0.000634**
(0.000322)
0.751***
(0.242)
-0.178
(0.176)
0.477**
(0.241)
0.256
(0.171)
-0.421**
(0.194)
-1.852**
(0.788)

-0.659**
(0.266)
-0.444*
(0.253)
-0.0271
(0.0709)
-0.189**
(0.0875)
0.551***
(0.121)
0.269
(0.253)
0.795**
(0.362)
0.504*
(0.284)
0.0649
(0.179)
0.213***
(0.0595)
-0.00580
(0.00494)
-0.00720
(0.0359)
0.000313
(0.000384)
0.423
(0.309)
0.351
(0.217)
-0.120
(0.283)
-0.481**
(0.190)
0.837***
(0.201)
-2.753***
(0.963)

-0.808***
(0.312)
-0.831***
(0.304)
-0.0487
(0.0906)
-0.0623
(0.108)
0.704***
(0.176)
0.304
(0.308)
0.901**
(0.416)
0.252
(0.353)
0.193
(0.221)
0.00156
(0.0768)
-0.0105
(0.00773)
-0.0558
(0.0431)
0.000737
(0.000469)
0.778**
(0.354)
0.107
(0.287)
0.108
(0.332)
0.554**
(0.281)
0.0772
(0.281)
-2.674**
(1.208)

854
854
854
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

854

Table 6. Immigration Policy and Vote Choice Multinomial Model
Hispanic identity, cultural assimilation, and policy preference by vote preference.
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as Hispanic, felt a strong sense of linked fate with other Hispanics, and supported liberal
immigration policies was more likely to not vote at all than to vote for Clinton.
Specifically, a voter who supported granting citizenship was more likely to turn out for a
third-party candidate than Clinton or Trump. Thus, while Trump was driving away
Hispanic voters based on a number of factors, Clinton was not benefiting from that effect.
These results are statistically significant with at least a 90% confidence interval (Table 6).
Because 37% of respondents did not turn out to vote, the cumulative effect of these
results is fairly large. Overall, while Hispanic support for liberal immigration policy did
suppress voter turnout for Trump, it did not translate to voter mobilization for Clinton.
On a final note, Clinton generated support among Puerto Rican and Other voters, while
Cuban origin had no effect on voter turnout—either for Clinton or Trump. This is
surprising, given that Cubans tend to support the Republican Party. With regards to
immigrant generation, second generation voters turned out for Clinton, third generation
voters turned out for both candidates, and fourth+ generation voters turned out for
Trump. This demonstrates a shift in support from the Democratic candidate to the
Republican candidate over immigrant generation. However, since 77% of respondents
are first or second-generation Hispanics, the effects of this transition on the 2016
Presidential Election are somewhat limited. This does merit further study in future
elections to determine if this pattern holds true.
V. Conclusion
Previous models on voter realignment focus on party-centric factors, particularly
party response to cross-cutting issues. I find support for the idea that Hispanic party
alignment can also be affected by demographic change, particularly immigrant generation

37

Panel 1

Panel 2

Panel 3

Panel 4

Panel 5

Figure 8. Margin Plots of Hispanic Identity and Demographic Change
Each panel shows the linear prediction of Democratic affiliation, with the Democratic
variable measured on a 1-7 scale. In the scale shown, 4 = Independent, 5 = Lean
Democrat, and 6 = Not Very Strong Democrat. Each panel includes 95% Confidence
Intervals. Note the general increase in the measures of Hispanic Identity (Panels 1-3)
and the general decrease in measured of demographic change (Panes 4-5). However, the
marginal effect is a strengthening or weakening of Democratic affiliation: the results do
not translate to full scale realignment to the Republican Party.
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and English proficiency. In general, measures of Hispanic identity are positively
associated with Democratic affiliation, while measures of demographic change are
negatively associated with Democratic affiliation. However, religious affiliation and
religiosity do not have an effect on party alignment, although there is some evidence to
suggest that religious affiliation and English proficiency can predict party affiliation. On
the other hand, divisive issues that heighten awareness of group identity, such as
immigration, can affect party alignment across generations. Measures of Hispanic
identity and support for liberal immigration policy reduced turnout for Trump, although
this decreased voter turnout rather than mobilizing voters for Clinton.
These results reveal several areas for further study. First, because these models
focus on one election, particularly an unusual election, further testing should be
conducted to verify the parameters of both party realignment models. To fully quantify
the dynamic effects of realignment, subsequent studies should examine Hispanic identity,
demographic change, and immigration policy over a period of time. Although existing
literature on party realignment emphasizes critical reelections and the 2016 Presidential
Election presented a unique opportunity to examine the effect of immigration policy,
there is also supporting literature demonstrating the value of studying the groundswell
leading up to an election. In addition, future studies should determine if the predicted
tends regarding immigrant generation and English proficiency hold true in future
elections.
Second, although the results do demonstrate a strengthening or weakening of
Democratic affiliation, the marginal effects do not translate to full scale party
realignment, with voters switching party affiliation. Given the existing literature on

39

minority cultures of assimilation, this model may oversimplify the effects of demographic
assimilation. It may be that, rather than assimilating to the political preferences of the
white majority, immigrants assimilate to the distinct preferences of a Hispanic minority.
If this is the case, one could measure the difference in political identity across generations
in majority Hispanic neighborhoods and minority Hispanic neighborhoods. Subsequent
study should therefore examine the geographic layout of the respondents and determine if
there is a difference between high-density Hispanic zip codes and low-density Hispanic
zip codes in predicting Democratic alignment.
Third, a more robust model of religious affiliation and English proficiency could be
developed with the inclusion of a survey question asking whether the respondent attends
a primarily Spanish or English-speaking congregation. This question would provide a
stronger measure of this interaction and perhaps shed additional light in the link between
religion and party affiliation, particularly given that there is some evidence to suggest that
an interaction between religion and language exists. In addition, further research is
needed to determine why there was no statistically significant relationship between
religious identity, religiosity and party alignment.
Finally, the vote choice model results were somewhat surprising, given that
immigration policy support suppressed turnout for the Republican candidate, but did not
translate to voter mobilization for the Democratic candidate. This merits closer
examination, because it suggests that policy position alone is not enough to guarantee
mobilization. Future studies should examine the Clinton campaign’s get out the vote
efforts among Hispanics in order to determine why, in an election cycle animated by
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immigration policy, the Democratic Party’s platform on immigration reform did not
translate to mobilized voters.
Overall, this paper demonstrates the value of expanded party realignment models
that consider other factors besides cross-cutting issues and presents several ways to
expand and build upon this theoretical foundation. It also illustrates the complexity of
Hispanic party affiliation and vote choice, emphasizing that neither Republican or
Democratic strategists should take Hispanic voting behavior for granted nor make
sweeping predictions about electoral wins based on a few isolated factors. Ultimately,
understanding the factors that influence Hispanic political attitudes and voting behavior is
critical in developing future election strategies.
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Appendix 1: Multicollinearity Tests
Hispanic
Identity
Hispanic
Identity
Perceived
Discrimination
Linked
Fate
English
Proficiency
Immigrant
Generation

Perceived
Discrimination

Linked
Fate

English
Proficiency

Immigrant
Generation

1
0.0877

1

0.1128

0.2356

1

-0.0851

0.1001

-0.0036

1

-0.1844

-0.0518

-0.1131

0.3928

1

Table 7. Collinearity Between Selected Variables
Variable
National Identity
Hispanic Identity
Discrimination
Linked Fate
Second Generation
Third Generation
Fourth+ Generation
English Proficiency
Catholic
Evangelical
Mainline Protestant
Other Religion
Religiosity
Male
Education Level
Family Income
Age

VIF

1/VIF

2.50 0.3994
2.25 0.4447
1.13 0.8881
1.13 0.8832
1.50 0.6676
1.36 0.7363
1.63 0.6144
1.50 0.6682
2.53 0.3955
2.47 0.4047
1.78 0.5603
1.59 0.6303
1.70 0.5878
1.17 0.8568
1.15 0.8695
1.03 0.9726
1.26 0.7945
Puerto Rico & Carib. 1.18 0.8483
Cuba & S. America 1.49 0.6724
1.35 0.7435
Other Region
Liberal Ideology
1.08 0.9261
Grant Citizenship
1.18 0.8484
Identify & Deport
1.18 0.8455
Mean VIF
1.53
-Table 8. VIF Test for OLS Models

Variable
Vote Choice
National Identity
Hispanic Identity
Perceived Discrimination
Linked Fate
Second Generation
Third Generation
Fourth+ Generation
English Proficiency
Male
Education Level
Family Income
Age
Puerto Rico & Carib.
Cuba & S. America
Other Region
Democrat (7)
Grant Citizenship
Identify & Deport
Mean VIF

VIF

1/VIF

1.30
2.63
2.35
1.16
1.15
1.52
1.33
1.70
1.62
1.16
1.17
1.02
1.22
1.19
1.51
1.36
1.27
1.25
1.25
1.43

0.7690
0.3805
0.4248
0.8626
0.8722
0.6589
0.7538
0.5886
0.6176
0.8638
0.8568
0.9799
0.8178
0.8418
0.6622
0.7339
0.7904
0.8001
0.7993
--

Table 9. VIF Test for Multinomial Models

46

Appendix 2: Frequency Tables
Party ID
Strong Republican
Not Very Strong Rep.
Lean Republican
Independent
Lean Democrat
Not Very Strong Dem.
Strong Democrat
Total

Freq.
159
95
54
236
192
331
777
1,844

Percent
8.62
5.15
2.93
12.8
10.41
17.95
42.14
100

Group ID
American
National Identity
Hispanic Identity
Total

Freq.
342
840
837
2,019

Percent
16.94
41.6
41.46
100

Discrimination
None at all
A little
A moderate amount
A lot
A great deal
Total

Freq.
702
587
313
184
207
1,993

Percent
35.22
29.45
15.7
9.23
10.39
100

Vote
Did not vote
Clinton
Trump
Other
Total

Freq.
325
365
143
46
879

Percent
36.97
41.52
16.27
5.23
100

Linked Fate
Not at all
Not much
Some
A lot
Total

Freq.
253
250
737
759
1,999

Percent
12.66
12.51
36.87
37.97
100

Reltrad
Unaffiliated
Catholic
Evangelical
Mainline Protestant
Other Religion
Total

Freq.
408
822
372
183
168
1,953

Percent
20.89
42.09
19.05
9.37
8.6
100

Immigration
First Generation
Second Generation
Third Generation
Fourth Generation

Freq.
1,100
468
177
278

Percent
54.37
23.13
8.75
13.74

Religiosity

Freq.

Percent

0.00 - .99
1.00 - 1.99

303
393

16.96
22.03

Total

2,023

100

2.00 - 2.99

835

46.78

English Proficiency

Freq.

Percent

3

254

14.23

Not at all

63

3.12

Total

1,785

100

Just a little

339

16.77

Not at all

63

3.12

Grant Citizenship

Freq.

Percent

Just a little

339

16.77

No

501

24.77

Pretty well

382

18.9

Yes

1,522

75.23

Very well

1,237

61.21

Total

2,023

100

Not at all

63

3.12

Identify and Deport

Freq.
1,640
383
2,023

Percent
81.07
18.93
100

Pretty well
Very well

382
1,237

18.9
61.21

Total

2,021

100

No
Yes
Total
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Percent
8.81
10.64
15.34
13.46
8.81
7.62
4.01
6.48
6.83
6.63
3.56

Country
Mexico
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela
Belize
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
Spain
Other
Puerto Rico
Total

Freq.
753
214
80
21
4
5
8
102
30
2
47
1
6
195
1
14
50
27
39
17
12
67
198
130
2,023

Percent
37.22
10.58
3.95
1.04
0.2
0.25
0.4
5.04
1.48
0.1
2.32
0.05
0.3
9.64
0.05
0.69
2.47
1.33
1.93
0.84
0.59
3.31
9.79
6.43
100

36
5

1.78
0.25

Region

Freq.

Percent

2

0.1

Mexico & C. America

913

45.13

$250 - $349

1

0.05

Puerto Rico & Caribbean

210

10.38

$350 - $499

1

0.05

Cuba & S. America

635

31.39

$500 or more
Prefer not to say

3
110

0.15
5.44

Other Region
Total

265
2,023

13.10
100

Total

2,021

100
Ideology
Not sure
Very Conservative
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
Very Liberal
Total

Freq.
215
139
375
639
405
250
2,023

Percent
10.63
6.87
18.54
31.59
20.02
12.36
100

Male
Female
Male
Total

Freq.
1,197
826
2,023

Percent
59.17
40.83
100

Education Level
No High School
High School
Some College
2-year
4-year
Post-grad
Total

Freq.
153
566
453
170
509
172
2,023

Percent
7.56
27.98
22.39
8.4
25.16
8.5
100

Family Income
Less than $10
$10 - $19
$20 - $29
$30 - $39
$40 - $49
$50 - $59
$60 - $69
$70 - $79
$80 - $99
$100 - $119
$120 - $149
$150 or more
$150 - $199
$200 - $249

Freq.
178
215
310
272
178
154
81
131
138
134
72
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Appendix 3: Wording for Survey Questions
In general, do you think of yourself as a…? 13
o Democrat
o Strong Democrat
o Not very strong Democrat
------------------------o Republican
o Strong Republican
o Not very strong Republican
------------------------o Independent
o The Democratic Party
o Other
o The Republican Party
o Not sure
o Neither
o Not sure
For whom did you vote for President of the United States?
o Donald Trump (Republican)
o Hillary Clinton (Democrat)
o Gary Johnson (Libertarian)
o Jill Stein (Green)
o Evan McMullin (Independent)
o Other
o I didn't vote in this election
o I'm not sure
In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?
o Very liberal
o Liberal
o Moderate
o Conservative
o Very conservative
o Not sure
What is your gender?
o Male
o Female
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
o Did not graduate from high school
o High school graduate
o Some college, but no degree (yet)
o 2-year college degree
o 4-year college degree
o Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.)
13

The second column indicates follow-up categories that appear depending on the answer
selected. All these answers collectively create the 7-point party identification variable.
49

Thinking back over the last year, what was your family’s annual income?
o Less than $10,000
o $100,000 - $119,999
o $10,000 - $19,999
o $120,000 - $149,999
o $20,000 - $29,999
o $150,000 or more
o $30,000 - $39,999
o $150,000 - $199,999
o $40,000 - $49,999
o $200,000 - $249,999
o $50,000 - $59,999
o $250,000 - $349,999
o $60,000 - $69,999
o $350,000 - $499,999
o $70,000 - $79,999
o $500,000 or more
o $80,000 - $99,999
o Prefer not to say
In what year were you born?
o [1900-2000]
From which country do you trace your heritage or ancestry?
o Mexico
o Colombia
o Puerto Rico
o Ecuador
o Cuba
o Guyana
o Dominican
o Paraguay
Republic
o Peru
o Argentina
o Suriname
o Bolivia
o Uruguay
o Brazil
o Venezuela
o Chile
o Belize

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
Spain

What racial or ethnic group best describes you?
o White
o Black or African-American
o Hispanic or Latino
o Asian or Asian-American
o Native American
o Middle Eastern
o Mixed Race
o Other
People sometimes use different terms to describe themselves. In general, which ONE of
the following terms do you use to describe yourself MOST OFTEN?
o [Country of Origin]
o Latinos
o Hispanic
o American
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How much discrimination is there in the United States today against [you]?
o A great deal
o A lot
o A moderate amount
o A little
o None at all
Do you think what happens generally to [Latinos] in this country will have something to
do with what happens in your life?
o A lot
o Some
o Not much
o Not at all
Which of these statements best describes you?
o I am an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen
o I am an immigrant to the USA but not a citizen
o I was born in the USA but at least one of my parents is an immigrant
o My parents and I were born in the USA but at least one of my grandparents was
an immigrant
o My parents, grandparents and I were all born in the USA
How well would you say you could carry on a conversation in English -- both
understanding and speaking?
o Very well
o Pretty well
o Just a little
o Not at all
RELTRAD
What is your present religion, if any?
o Protestant
o Roman Catholic
o Mormon
o Eastern or Greek Orthodox
o Jewish
o Muslim
o Buddhist
o Hindu
o Atheist
o Agnostic
o Nothing in particular
o Something else

To which Protestant church or group do
you belong?
o Baptist
o Methodist
o Nondenominational or Independent
Church
o Lutheran
o Presbyterian
o Pentecostal
o Episcopalian
o Church of Christ or Disciples of
Christ
o Congregational or United Church of
Christ Holiness
o Reformed
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(Continued...)
o Adventist
o Jehovah’s Witness
o Something else

To which Presbyterian church do you
belong?
o Presbyterian Church USA
o Presbyterian Church in America
o Associate Reformed Presbyterian
o Cumberland Presbyterian Church
o Orthodox Presbyterian
o Evangelical Presbyterian Church
o Other Presbyterian Church

To which Baptist church do you belong, if
any?
o Southern Baptist Convention
o American Baptist Churches in USA
o National Baptist Convention
o Progressive Baptist Convention
o Independent Baptist
o Baptist General Conference
o Baptist Missionary Association
o Conservative Baptist Assoc. of
America
o Free Will Baptist
o General Association of Regular
Baptists
o Other Baptist

To which Pentecostal church do you
belong?
o Assemblies of God
o Church of God Cleveland TN
o Four Square Gospel
o Pentecostal Church of God
o Pentecostal Holiness Church
o Church of God in Christ
o Church of God of the Apostolic
Faith
o Assembly of Christian Churches
o Apostolic Christian
o Other Pentecostal Church

To which Methodist church do you belong,
if any?
o United Methodist Church
o Free Methodist Church
o African Methodist Episcopal
o African Methodist Episcopal Zion
o Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church
o Other Methodist Church

To which Episcopalian church do you
belong?
o Episcopal Church in the USA
o Anglican Church (Church of
England)
o Anglican Orthodox Church
o Reformed Episcopal Church
o Other Episcopalian or Anglican
Church

To which kind of nondenominational or
independent church do you belong, if any?
o Nondenominational evangelical
o Nondenominational fundamentalist
o Nondenominational charismatic
o Interdenominational
o Community church
o Other

To which congregational church do you
belong?
o United Church of Christ
o Conservative Congregational
Christian
o National Association of
Congregational Christians
o Other Congregational

To which Lutheran church do you belong?
o Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America (ELCA) Lutheran Church,
Missouri Synod
o Lutheran Church, Wisconsin Synod
o Other Lutheran Church
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To which Holiness church do you belong?
o Church of the Nazarene
o Wesleyan Church
o Free Methodist Church
o Christian and Missionary Alliance
o Church of God (Anderson, Indiana)
o Salvation Army, American Rescue
workers
o Other Holiness

To which Reformed church do you
belong?
o Reformed Church in America
o Christian Reformed Church
o Other Reformed

How important is religion in your life?
o Very important
o Somewhat important
o Not too important
o Not at all important
Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious serviced?
o More than once a week
o Once a week
o Once or twice a month
o A few times a year
o Seldom
o Never
People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services,
how often do you pray?
o Several times a day
o Once a day
o A few times a week
o Once a week
o A few times a month
o Seldom
o Never
What do you think the US government should do about immigration? Select all that apply
o Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for
at least 3 years, and hot been convicted of any felony crimes
o Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border
o Grant legal status to people who were brought to the US illegally as children, but
who have graduated from a US high school
o Fine US businesses that hire illegal immigrants
o Admit no refugees from Syria
o Increase the number of visas for overseas workers to work in the US
o Identify and deport illegal immigrants
o Ban Muslims from immigrating to the US
o None of these
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